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STATEMENT OF
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE
THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

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Mr Chairman, members of the Armed Services Committee:

I welcome this opportunity to discuss the threats to US interests world-wide over the remainder of this decade.

We have witnessed in recent years a massive global transformation. The Cold War is over, the major military threat to the United States has receded, and the danger of war in Europe and of nuclear holocaust has vastly diminished. Many regional conflicts are coming to an end, particularly those conducted around the world through surrogates. And the forces of reform in what was the Soviet Union are ascendant.

On the other hand, we face a paradox as we confront new and unexpected challenges, as well as familiar concerns and risks. The demise of the Soviet system offers a promise of greater liberalization and economic transformation. International cooperation has increased. Yet the side effects of success in this long struggle will continue to have destabilizing and dangerous implications and will confront us with new and, in many cases, unexpected challenges: the sudden appearance of 15 new countries, in place of a single familiar empire, and enormous problems in all of them. In the process of disintegration now unfolding, the former Soviet Union faces internal crises and the

possibility of large-scale civil disorder, while it continues to possess some 30,000 nuclear warheads, the most powerful of which are still aimed at us. And the subsidence of the superpower contest has allowed other conflicts to come to the fore in the former USSR among various republic and ethnic groups.

Beyond the borders of Russia and the other newly sovereign republics lie other very real challenges to peace and international order and thus to the United States:

- The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and related delivery systems. Over 20 states have or are acquiring weapons of mass destruction. These arsenals are often in the hands of unstable and unreliable governments. The most dangerous external effect of the Soviet break-up is to add fuel to this fire of proliferation--at least potentially.
- Ethnic and territorial disputes in Eastern Europe have risen to the surface and threaten political instability and civil war, despite promising prospects for the development of democratic institutions and market economics.

- Embattled Communist regimes remain in place in China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba.

- The potential for conflict in the Middle East and South Asia-- where many states import arms and develop weapons of mass destruction--remains high, despite some encouraging prospects for peacemaking in the wake of the Gulf War and the loss of the superpower patron of many states.

- Finally, although we can see an encouraging trend toward political pluralism in many parts of the world, the foundations of fledgling democratic systems are weak and could be undermined by regional conflict, sectarian hostility, and economic misery.

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The Military Picture

General Clapper will describe in greater detail the remaining conventional and strategic forces of the former Soviet Union. My brief characterization of these forces is that the threat to the United States of deliberate attack from that quarter has all but disappeared for the foreseeable future.

On one hand:

- The capabilities of the strategic forces are being significantly reduced. Modernization programs are likely to be delayed or abandoned, and training will be cut back.
- The readiness of conventional forces is at the lowest level in many years. Naval deployments continue to decline from already reduced levels, and inadequate training is degrading the combat capability of the general purpose forces.

On the other hand:

- We cannot ignore the implications of the thousands of nuclear weapons in Russia, Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan.

Tactical weapons are being withdrawn to secure storage sites in Russia, and all parties have agreed that command and control of

strategic nuclear weapons should be maintained, but the viability of the Commonwealth of Independent States, in whose name these weapons are controlled, is not certain.

-- Over the longer term, if the democratic forces in the Commonwealth do not prevail, a new military threat could reemerge from the region.

Internal to the states of the former Soviet Union, the transition to democracy and a market economy obviously is difficult. The Russian economy continues to spiral downward. Although it is too early to gauge their prospects, Yel'tsin's market reforms have not yet reversed this trend. Privation and public anger at painful reforms could--with the disintegration of the armed forces and ethnic conflict--combine to provoke civil disorder over the next several months.

If Yel'tsin's reforms have not put affordable goods on the shelves by spring, his political position, despite the large reservoir of public support for him, will diminish, as will his ability to push ahead with economic reform. Moreover, the economic and social challenges facing Russia and the other newly independent states of the region are

so great that their governments could be overwhelmed before democracy and market reform can take root. For these reasons, the prognosis for the former Soviet Union is clouded at best.

In Eastern Europe, progress toward democracy and free markets is obstructed by harsh economic realities, turmoil in the Commonwealth, or the difficulty antagonistic groups have in compromising and cooperating with one another. Ethnic tensions are reemerging. The conflict in Yugoslavia is illustrative of the force of ethnic rivalry; we should hope, but cannot be confident, that Yugoslavia is unique in its propensity for violence.

As in the past, the Balkans have again become the least stable part of Eastern Europe. The anti-communist revolutions of Albania and Romania are incomplete. Emerging from the breakup of Yugoslavia is a checkerboard of insecure states that will seek ties with Western Europe and with the United States to protect them from antagonistic neighbors. The danger of substantial ethnic strife in or among these new states--in the worst case--could spill over into Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania, whose fragile governments would be hard put to cope with it.

Proliferation Issues: An Overview

The steady and worrisome growth in the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons around the world is of gravest concern. For decades, the international community has worked from the premise that the more countries possessing these weapons, the greater the likelihood that they will be used. Of what once were hostile states, only China and the successors of the former Soviet Union now have the physical capability to strike the United States directly with weapons of mass destruction. We do not expect direct threats to the US to arise within the next decade. Nonetheless, the threat to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia is real and increasing:

- Several countries have missiles that could carry nuclear warheads and threaten US interests, forces or allies.
- Most major Middle Eastern countries have chemical weapons development programs, and some already have weapons that could be used against civilians or poorly defended military targets. Most have not yet equipped their delivery systems to carry weapons of mass destruction. Over the next decade, however, we expect such weapons to become more widespread

from North Africa through South Asia if international efforts fail to curtail this proliferation.

- North Korea and China have sold other countries longer range missiles and the technology to produce them. China has agreed to observe the guidelines of the Missile Control Technology Regime when the US lifts the sanctions imposed in 1991. But unless sales of such missiles are stopped, it is altogether too likely that these delivery systems, over time, will be mated with weapons of mass destruction, especially in the Middle East and South Asia.

The breakup of the Soviet Union adds a new dimension to the problem of proliferation:

- It threatens the reliability of Moscow's centralized command and control systems and could unleash materials that have hitherto been carefully controlled.
- Defense industries that face cuts in military funding may try to stay in business by selling equipment, services, and materials in the international marketplace.

- The need for hard currency could take precedence over proliferation concerns, particularly among republic and local governments with high concentrations of defense industry and little else that is marketable.
- The tens of thousands of scientists and engineers associated with Soviet weapons programs constitute a potentially dangerous "brain drain" from the former Soviet republics. Only a fraction of these specialists can actually design nuclear weapons or run a program to develop and produce biological weapons. But we know from experience that small numbers of key people count. Most of the potential emigrants will stay home and work for the betterment of their homeland, and others would prefer to settle in the West. Some, however, may be tempted to sell their expertise to Third World countries trying to acquire or improve special weapons capabilities.

The Potential for Conflict Elsewhere in the World

The Middle East remains dangerously unstable, notwithstanding the Coalition's victory in the Gulf War and the new and encouraging phase of negotiations in the Arab-Israeli confrontation.

Iraq

Although Saddam Husayn's ability in the next several years to threaten the stability of the Gulf region and the world's oil supply has been crippled, Baghdad continues to pose a major challenge. Over the years, Saddam built formidable programs in all four areas of weapons of mass destruction--nuclear, chemical, biological, and missiles. As long as international resolve to maintain sanctions, including UN inspections, remains firm, Saddam's efforts to rebuild his weapons programs will be sharply hampered, but the threat they pose continues to challenge us.

DESERT STORM inflicted heavy damage on Iraq's special weapons programs. They will need time to recover:

- Nuclear weapons production will need the most time, but only a few years, because the infrastructure for the production of fissile material must be rebuilt.

- The infrastructure for the production of chemical weapons also was hit hard and will need rebuilding. But most of the production equipment was hidden before the bombing started. If UN sanctions were relaxed, Iraq could produce modest quantities of chemical agents almost immediately.
- The biological weapons program was damaged, but critical equipment was hidden during the war. The Iraqis could produce BW materials in a matter of weeks of their decision to do so.
- Substantial numbers of SCUD missiles and production equipment remain. The time and cost to Iraq of reviving its missile program will depend on the continuation of the inspection regime and Saddam's ability to obtain critical equipment from abroad.

Iran

Tehran--despite the apparent pragmatism of President Rafsanjani--still poses a potential threat to its smaller neighbors and to the free flow of oil through the Gulf. It continues to support terrorism as an instrument of state policy--despite its role in securing the release of hostages. And Tehran has embarked on an ambitious effort to develop

its military and defense industries, including programs for weapons of mass destruction. It shops Western markets for nuclear and missile technology, may turn to the republics of the former Soviet Union for such technology and expertise, and increasingly has looked to Asian sources of military and technical aid--to North Korea for long-range SCUDs and to China for missiles and nuclear-related technologies.

Syria

Damascus also has turned to North Korea for an extended range missile and apparently is seeking assistance from China and Western firms for an improved capability with chemical or biological warheads.

Libya

Qadhafi's chemical weapons program has produced and stockpiled as many as 100 tons of chemical agents. Nor has Libya abandoned its long-term goal of extending its military reach across the eastern Mediterranean; it is shopping throughout the world for an alternative source of longer range missiles.

Algeria

The Algerians have nearly finished building the nuclear reactor they bought from China. Both Algeria and China have assured us that the

reactor will be used only for peaceful purposes, but we remain concerned about the secrecy of the original agreements and the lack of inspections.

South Asia

The intense suspicion between India and Pakistan--generated by four decades of confrontation and intermittent conflict--creates a risk of war through misunderstanding or miscalculation. For this reason, the arms race between these two countries remains a major concern. Not only do both countries have programs for the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, they have pursued chemical weapons as well. We have no reason to believe that either maintains assembled or deployed nuclear bombs, but such weapons, we believe, could be assembled quickly. At the moment, the threat of a fourth Indo-Pakistani war seems to have diminished with the adoption of confidence-building measures and more frequent communication, but the danger remains.

East Asia

North Korea's nuclear program is our greatest security concern in Northeast Asia. P'yongyang can support the development of nuclear

weapons from the mining of uranium to the reprocessing of reactor fuel to recover plutonium. In December 1991, North and South Korea negotiated an historic agreement for a nuclear-free peninsula.

Verification, however, including on-site inspection, remains to be worked out. And so far we have had only verbal assurances from North Korea on this point.

The value of the Korean agreements can be judged only by the inspection regime that North Korea ultimately accepts. If the agreement is supported by effective verification, including prompt implementation of IAEA safeguards, it will help meet our concerns about nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. Overall, however, our concerns about the North's nuclear effort extend beyond the peninsula itself. We worry about the consequences for stability in Northeast Asia if North Korea acquires nuclear weapons and also about the possibility that P'yongyang might put these weapons, and the technology that produced them, into the international marketplace.

North Korea has invested heavily in the military and depends on exports for much of its hard currency. It has sold SCUDs to several

Middle Eastern countries and also has modified its SCUDs to give them a longer range; it has sold these to Iran and Syria.

In addition, the stability of the government after Kim Il-sung passes from the scene is questionable. The North has a million-man army: nearly two-thirds of its ground combat forces are deployed in offensive formation within 60 miles of the demilitarized zone, just north of Seoul. In sum, the Korean peninsula remains a dangerous locality for international security.

Africa

Africa presents few direct threats to US interests, but it remains volatile and troubled. US military forces again may be called on for emergency evacuations, as occurred in Liberia in 1990 and in Somalia in 1991. Moreover, persistent turmoil in several countries works against democratic and free market tendencies and encourages meddling by such predatory outsiders as Libya.

-- In Sudan, the government's rigidly Islamist policies are prolonging the civil war. Iran's influence also is worrisome.

- The anarchy in Somalia is one of the world's worst humanitarian crises. Again, there are no indications that the situation will improve soon.
- Chad is an ethnic tinderbox, perennially vulnerable to Muammar Qadhafi, the regional arsonist.
- Liberia is quiet now, thanks to the peacekeeping force deployed there with US help, but the fighting has spilled over into Sierra Leone and threatens to disrupt the stability of other neighboring states.
- Mozambique is moving toward a political settlement, but the civil war continues to take a huge toll on civilians and to disrupt neighboring countries.

Yet there are hopeful signs in Africa. We witnessed last year remarkable progress toward resolving longstanding conflicts in Ethiopia and Angola. And in South Africa, government and opposition have begun to work out a more equitable future for that racially divided country. Moreover, in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, countries facing economic disaster are turning to democracy and opening the way for vast improvements in the way Africans are

governed. Elections in Zambia, Benin, Sao Tome, and Cape Verde already have led to peaceful transfers of power. And pressure for democratic reforms is increasing in Kenya and Zaire. But these positive tendencies confront awesome challenges from decades of misrule, economic disorder, and the mounting demographic crisis of AIDS.

Latin America

In Latin America, the big story is essentially positive: Democratic rule is in the ascendancy, and the chronic conflicts of Central America are ending. But again we observe the paradoxical combination of positive and negative phenomena.

In Peru, the democratically elected Fujimori administration faces a combination of problems more threatening and intractable than those of any other democratic government in Latin America. It confronts serious economic difficulties, two major insurgencies, and daunting narcotics problems; more than 60 percent of the world's cocaine originates in Peru.

Sendero Luminoso, perhaps the world's most savage guerrilla-terrorist organization, has gained sway over large areas of the

Peruvian countryside. Both Sendero and the Tupac-Amaru terrorist group are increasingly involved in narcotics trafficking. Both groups place US citizens and installations at substantial risk.

The situation in Haiti remains highly unstable. The political deadlock there threatens continued violence and a major, chronic refugee problem for the US.

In Cuba, Castro is in an unprecedented bind. The halt in Soviet aid had devastated his economy. Factories are closing, and growing numbers of people are being moved into agricultural work camps. Meanwhile, as opposition from human rights activists and other emerging pockets of dissent increases, the regime responds with more repression in an effort to remain in power. Such repression is likely only to magnify the hardships of the Cuban people and the explosion that eventually may occur.

Global Security Issues

I have already described in some detail the continuing threat to global stability and peace of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As you know, this problem is one of our top priorities, and we in intelligence have made organizational changes to deal with it

more effectively. The Nonproliferation Center we have formed will help us support our government's policy in timely and effective fashion.

But we face other global challenges:

Terrorism

Terrorism remains a threat in many countries. State sponsorship of terrorism has been declining because of the political and economic penalties it incurs and the end of Soviet support for radical regimes and groups. On the other hand, terrorism by indigenous separatist and insurgent groups will continue to pose a serious threat to international stability and also to US lives and property in parts of Europe, Latin America, and Asia in coming years.

The political upheaval in Eastern Europe and the successor states of the former Soviet Union has created conditions favoring the birth of new, ethnic-based terrorist and paramilitary groups. Some already have appeared. Most would be unlikely purposely to attack US targets. But they could threaten the orderly evolution of democratic and stable societies in which we clearly have an interest.

We can foresee several potential terrorist trouble spots in coming years. Developments in the Arab-Israeli peace process, for example, are likely to stimulate attacks against various participants, including the United States, by groups opposed to the negotiations.

Narcotics

International narcotics traffic remains a major security concern of the United States and thus a major focus of our intelligence efforts. Eradication and interdiction measures in source countries, while partially effective, have not measurably reduced supplies, which continue to be more than adequate to meet demand. And traffickers are countering the effectiveness of record interdiction efforts--particularly against cocaine--by shifting their routes and tactics.

The international heroin trade is growing as sources of supply continue to diversify. World-wide opium production has increased and is now many times the amount needed to meet Western demand. Southeast Asia accounts for almost 60 percent of the US market. New opium production in Colombia poses an additional threat as cocaine traffickers expand into heroin because of its higher profits and easier transport.

Eliminating the production of illegal drugs is nearly impossible. Crops are often produced in areas where governments have little or no control or where political instability and corruption impede enforcement. The international drug control community is beginning to respond to the limitations of eradication and interdiction efforts by intensifying pressure on the drug trade's top leaders.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, I began my remarks by referring to a paradox, The classic superpower enemy has gone, but much of what he assembled is still there and is potentially dangerous. I mention this again to highlight the point that, while the collapse of communism has greatly reduced the chance of a major war, the world remains in a dangerously unstable state. The burden on the United States is heavy because nearly all nations see us as the principal force for international peace and stability.

The US intelligence community is a major factor in dealing with the remaining threats to our interests and the challenges that lie ahead. US intelligence helped the United States and the world get through half a

century of Cold War without a nuclear holocaust or defeat at the hands of totalitarian forces.

- Intelligence will continue to track the dangers and instabilities we face, especially in light of the huge arsenal left behind from the Cold War that may fall into irresponsible hands. We shall continue, using all the instruments at our disposal, to collect and analyze information and to provide warning about the dangers I have just described. The tools we employed to track the activities of the Soviet Union are equally useful against other targets.
- The intelligence community also will intensify its attention to threats that have long been on the US agenda--terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and the proliferation of special weapons.
- And it will focus more sharply on the dynamics of the international economy and the implications of the technological revolution, both of which will have a great impact on the future well being of Americans and those who share our values.

- Intelligence will continue to be a crucial player in making possible arms control agreements--through monitoring--and assisting international peacekeeping efforts.
- Finally, we will remain vigilant to alert policymakers to opportunities for shaping the international environment. We will look closely at the policy implications of intelligence analysis. For example, in the estimates we prepare, our analysts are using their expertise to identify opportunities for advancing US policies and identifying new ones, including examining the potential pitfalls of various courses of action. This process is well under way, as manifested in the series of over a dozen national intelligence estimates published in the last several weeks.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to close on a positive note. Although the world of the 1990s will remain a dangerous place, it is also an arena in which promise will often outweigh menace and in which opportunities for constructive action will outnumber the threats of our security.

Question: How likely is civil disorder in Russia and what threat does it pose to political stability?

Answer: Over the next few months, the amount of social and political unrest in Russia will probably be greater than at any time since the end of the civil war. Severe economic conditions, the decline of military discipline, and continuing interethnic conflict within and across Russia's borders have created a political powderkeg. Growing public dismay over skyrocketed prices for food and consumer goods will almost certainly lead to protests, demonstrations, strikes, and even scattered violence. Russia's chances of preventing a social explosion that would overwhelm or topple the government depend critically on Yel'tsin's ability to manage painful reforms. A large reservoir of public support will probably carry him through the winter, but Yel'tsin's reforms will have to put affordable goods on the store shelves by spring or his political position will decline, perhaps precipitously.

In the longer term, Russia's political development depends directly on economic prosperity. Nations historically have been unable to build stable democratic political institutions during economic decline and social chaos. Without a marked improvement in Russia's economic performance, democratic government cannot survive.

Question: What is the likelihood of a coup against Yel'tsin during the next several months?

Answer: Prospects for a coup attempt are low. The current weaknesses of the most likely instigators of a coup attempt--a cabal of Russian nationalists and elements of the old regime--probably preclude unified action. Public support for the agenda of this group remains weak, and it does not have a widespread following among the institutions which would be essential to a successful coup: the military and the security services.

Mounting economic desperation, however, could eventually make the general population easy prey for a disciplined nationalist movement. An attempt to overthrow Yel'tsin becomes much more likely if, contrary to our expectations, the economic situation approaches worst-case proportions. If popular despair were deep enough, a takeover could succeed for several months in maintaining control. Even if a coup against Yel'tsin failed, there is a danger that he would be killed, initiating a period of chaos. Prospects for a coup led by nationalists and remnants of the old regime would also increase substantially if Yel'tsin dies or is incapacitated.

Question: Will Yel'tsin take coercive measures to maintain order in the face of mounting economic and political difficulties?

Answer: Yel'tsin almost certainly will use his existing constitutional powers to deal with Russia's economic and political turmoil. This would allow him to limit some civil liberties and other constitutional guarantees and unilaterally implement strong economic measures for example, by banning strikes or demonstrations. Such measures initially probably would receive popular support from a populace tired of talk and eager for action and some semblance of order. There is a significant chance that worsening conditions could lead Yel'tsin to take even stronger steps, including suspension of local governments and rule by decree.

Yel'tsin remains firmly committed to democratization and free markets and is unlikely to revert to dictatorial rule. Nevertheless, he must walk a tightrope between measures needed to maintain civil order and control and those that would imperil the reform process. Moreover, he probably will do what he deems necessary to preserve his government. Given Russia's history, steps designed to restore order could generate momentum toward dictatorial rule and the end of reforms.

Question: What are the prospects for Yel'tsin's economic reform agenda?

Answer: Yel'tsin's promised economic reforms would put Russia on the path to a market economy if implemented as planned. The Intelligence Community, however, is divided over his reform's likely path. Some argue that Yel'tsin has the popular support and political skill to implement large portions of his program over the near term, although obstacles abound and some slippage is likely. These analysts point to the price liberalization of 2 January as evidence that Yel'tsin recognizes that the economy's problems are too serious to buy stability by deferring painful reforms.

Other analysts are less confident. They believe that the pace of reforms will be much slower than planned as Yel'tsin confronts resistance and footdragging from within his own government, the Russian parliament, and local authorities and bureaucrats. Moreover, they argue Yel'tsin will slow the pace of reforms--and possibly retreat in some areas--to avoid the use of coercive measures to quell unrest.

Question: What is the current state of CIS Strategic Forces?

Answer: Strategic forces operations appear to have been affected by spending cuts, material shortages, and changing strategic policy. System reliability and operational flexibility probably will decline this year as shortages grow more serious, force levels decrease, modernization is slowed and field activity declines. Nevertheless, military authorities remain capable of delivering a devastating nuclear strike.

Strategic Rocket Forces.

- SS-25 road-mobile ICBM operations continue despite fuel and other shortages.
- Since Gorbachev's 5 October announcement, field deployments of rail-mobile SS-24's have stopped.
- CIS officials recently have said that the SS-19 and SS-24 silo-based ICBMs deployed in Ukraine have had their warheads removed.

Strategic Naval Forces. Deployments of ballistic missile submarines are at an historically low level and most appear to be in port.

Soviet Air Forces. Heavy bomber operations are being reduced probably because of fuel shortages. (see also classified version)

Question: Who is in control of CIS nuclear weapons at the senior level?

Answer: Russian President Yel'tsin assumed control of CIS nuclear forces from Gorbachev on Christmas day. Previously, the Soviets had three nuclear briefcases: they were held by the President, the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of the General Staff. The status of these briefcases has been changing as the transition to command arrangements for the CIS is being made interim Commander in Chief of Commonwealth Armed Forces (formerly the Minister of Defense) Shaposhnikov said early this month that he and Yel'tsin are the only ones that have them, and that the third is now in reserve. Moscow's centralized nuclear command and control system, therefore, has continued to function even as control of conventional forces begins to shift to the republics.

However, we are still examining how the other nuclear republics--Ukraine, Byelarus, and Kazakhstan--might participate in arrangements for the new National Command Authority's control of nuclear weapons. They have said they want to participate, while agreeing to weapon withdrawals from their territories. (There is some doubt, however, whether President Nazarbayev is committed to giving up the *strategic* nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan.) Building a new command and control system that enables those non-Russian republic leaders to have significant influence and that also permits the timely issuance and execution of orders will be difficult. (see classified addendum)

Question: What are the prospects for START implementation in the former Soviet Union?

Answer: The prospects for implementing START are good as long as Russia maintains control of strategic nuclear forces and the other three republics where such forces are located continue to cooperate. The desire for Western aid provides a powerful incentive for the republics to adhere to START.

Nevertheless, domestic tensions and resource constraints--as well as confusion over locational restrictions, required notifications, and inspection procedures--are likely to lead to delays in meeting treaty deadlines. If cooperation among the republics breaks down, disruptions in START implementation could become more severe. If hostilities between the nuclear republics erupt, other security concerns would likely override START considerations.

Question: What is the likelihood of the new republics cheating on arms reductions agreements?

Answer: We doubt that in the near term the republics could successfully execute sophisticated cheating programs, mainly because the disintegration of the former Soviet Union is giving us access to much data previously keep secret. Also, republic coordination of military activities has become problematic.

Question: How will provisions designed to enhance verification facilitate our ability to monitor START?

Answer: Treaty provisions providing for on-site inspections, regular data exchanges, and notifications will enhance our monitoring capabilities and may help deter some cheating. In addition, unimpeded access to telemetry data from ballistic missile flights tests--including the requirement to provide telemetry tapes for such tests--should significantly enhance our ability to monitor the characteristics of ICBMs and SLBMs. (See classified answer)

Question: Is the CIS dismantling nuclear weapons as promised by Gorbachev?

Answer: Although the CIS appears to be consolidating nuclear weapons from other republics into Russia, we are uncertain whether these weapons are being dismantled. Indeed, the capability of Russia to quickly and safely dismantle the thousands of weapons proposed for destruction is questionable. Knowledgeable CIS officials have claimed 1,500-2,000 weapons can be dismantled annually -- but we have only moderate confidence in this claim.

Although the Soviets have decades of experience in designing, building, and managing a stockpile of some 30,000 weapons, their facilities -- all which are in Russia -- and trained personnel may be inadequate to dismantle safely and dispose of the thousands of weapons slated for destruction in less than a decade. (See classified answer)

Question: What impact has the political and economic disintegration of the Soviet Union had on CIS missile defense capabilities?

Answer: Senior officials of the former USSR and the Russian Republic acknowledge that they face serious difficulties in detecting ballistic missile attacks:

- Some of the redundancy in the early warning system has been lost because over-the-horizon radars are no longer in operation.
- US ICBM launches can still be detected with early warning radars, but the capability to detect SLBM attacks is more limited. Access to BMEW radars in some republics is no longer assured because about two-thirds of the operational early warning radars are located outside Russia.
- Launch detections satellites can only detect launches of ICBMs from the United States. Military officials have complained that the system has a high false-detection rate.

Commonwealth and Russian officials are eager to continue the dialogue with the US on early warning issues because of the growing problem in strategic stability caused by the diminution of CIS BMEW capabilities. They may have difficulty arranging for the use of warning facilities outside Russia. They will not be able to build new radars and space-based systems in the next 10 years.

Question: What is the status of CIS strategic air defenses, and how have they been affected by the disintegration of the Soviet Union?

Answer: The integrated air defense system remains operational throughout the 12 former Soviet republics and the three Baltic states. No important changes in force structure, operations, or readiness have been detected. However, we eventually expect significant reductions.

- The new air defense chief, Colonel General Prudnikov has acknowledged reductions in funding and personnel. He wants to abandon barrier defense and restrict coverage to facilities of vital importance.
- The Baltic states have insisted that all forces eventually depart. Defense leaders have been pressing for some to remain, because withdrawing them all would be difficult and expensive and would severely degrade defenses in the Northwest.
- Some republics plan to nationalize military assets, while others intend to cooperate in establishing commonwealth-wide air defenses.

These reductions likely will result in a serious degradation of the integrated air defense network. Some key elements such as the SA-10 Force, however, are less likely to be cut back.

Question: What is the current status of strategic offensive forces modernization programs, and which programs do we judge most likely to reach fruition during this decade?

Answer: Strategic offensive forces modernization is continuing, albeit at a slightly reduced level.

- SS-18 ICBMS continue to be produced in Ukraine, with new deployments in Kazakhstan and Russia.
- SS-25 ICBMS continue to be produced in Russia, with new deployments in Byelarus and Russia.
- Blackjack bombers continue to be produced in Russia and deployed in Ukraine, although it is likely that the Blackjack program is nearing completion.

No ballistic missile submarines are currently under construction nor are any new SSBNS likely to be deployed within the decade.

Although evidence suggests that development of five new strategic missiles continues, many of these programs likely will be terminated eventually. The programs most likely to be deployed are the SS-25 follow-on road-mobile ICBM and the SS-N-20 follow-on SLBM for the Typhoon submarine. (see classified version)

Question: Will disputes similar to that between Russia and Ukraine over the Black Sea Fleet be repeated in other republics as the Red Army disintegrates?

Answer: [REDACTED] Negotiating division of conventional weapons, equipment, installations and other property of the former Soviet Armed Forces will be difficult. The dispute over division of the Black Sea Fleet is a precedent-setting case, and negotiations over the fleet are providing a forum for testing republic strategic priorities. Many issues were papered over or left open by the republics, including which forces are "strategic."

Disagreement over military assets increasingly will be exacerbated by nationalistic appeals from politicians and military leaders. Nevertheless, we believe that the leadership of the republics see negotiated solutions as the best option and will work towards that end, despite continual flareups.

Negotiations could fail if:

- Widespread military disintegration at the local unit level leads to massive republic seizures of military equipment.
- Widespread civil disorder, interethnic violence, or border disputes erupt.
- Change in a republic government, particularly Russia or Ukraine, changes security priorities.
- Russia refuses to accommodate the concerns of other republics regarding control of their own armed forces.

Question: What are the prospects for weapons modernization by republic militaries?

Answer: Comparatively few new weapons programs will reach fruition during this decade. Deteriorating political and economic conditions, and low threat perceptions will cause leaders to support very few programs.

Work on many development programs continues, and it is difficult at this time to say which will survive. Many programs will be curtailed or terminated; others will be frozen in place while the military struggles to develop new doctrines and attendant force structures. Present trends point to:

- Smaller strategic offensive forces, probably below START levels (under Russian control), and a reduced strategic air defense effort.
- Much smaller general purpose forces, mostly republic-controlled, emphasizing antitank and air defense weapons with the priority on qualitative improvements.
- Reduced naval forces that concentrate on the defense of maritime flanks and the protection of fewer SSBNs in the bastions.

Question: What impact will events in Algeria have on democratization in the Arab world? Could we have an Islamist movement that respects democratic values after taking power?

Answer: In the Arab states, as in many other parts of the world, democracy is fragile, and progress will come slowly. If a process of broader participation in public affairs is to stand a chance in the region, it must reflect local cultures, values, and traditions.

Islam today is engaged in a difficult struggle to reconcile its principles and values with those of the modern world. Such syntheses are not easily accomplished. For a considerable time to come, however, the key question is whether existing regimes will permit Islamic forces to come to power through democratic procedures. The evidence from Algeria suggests they will not.

Question: Will the succession in North Korea proceed smoothly? Will a new government change its fundamental policies?

Answer: The process of grooming and training Kim Chong-il as the successor to his father, Kim II-song, has been going on for nearly two decades. Most recently, the son was appointed Supreme Commander of the North Korean Armed Forces, and speculation is again rising (not for the first time) that the formal succession will take place soon. If the younger Kim has some time to establish himself, with his father operating behind the scenes, his odds for survival over the longer term will increase. -He faces serious problems, however, as a result of his odd personality and questionable leadership capabilities and the rivalries and ambitions hidden by his father's totalitarian controls. Although there are some who believe the younger Kim may want to pursue economic reform policies similar to those practiced by China, having his father behind the scenes guaranteeing the succession will limit his flexibility. If the elder Kim dies before the son is well-established, the odds against him will rise dramatically.

Question: Is the settlement in Angola unravelling? will UNITA win the elections?

Answer: Tensions remain, and the process of assembling and demobilizing troops from both sides has slowed. But the UN observer force at the scene has reported no major violations of the cease-fire. Moreover, the government has pledged to hold elections in September. This political deadline will keep the key players focused on fulfilling the accords signed last May. Although it's much too early to predict the outcome, we expect UNITA will do well.

Question: Is Sudan supporting terrorism and subverting other countries in the region?

Answer: Many countries in the region are understandably concerned about growing contacts between Sudanese fundamentalists and like-minded groups elsewhere in the Islamic world. Sudan recently has strengthened ties to Iran as evidenced by the visit of Iranian President Rafsanjani to Khartoum last month. Radical Palestinian groups have been allowed to establish a presence in Sudan. Although no terrorist operations have been launched from Sudan recently, we are monitoring these evolving relationships very closely.

Question: Will worsening violence derail settlement talks in South Africa?

Answer: We are encouraged by the commitment of key South African leaders, especially De Klerk and Mandela, to peacefully work out a more equitable system. Last month's conference on transitional arrangements and a new constitution was a vital step forward. But endemic violence is worrisome. The violence has many roots--including rising crime, ethnic conflict, and outright political terrorism by opponents of reconciliation.

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Question: Are facilities in the former Soviet Union producing nuclear materials for weapons?

Answer: The Soviets have said that they terminated production of highly enriched uranium for weapons in 1989. They also indicated that they planned to shut down all plutonium production reactors by 2000. Seven have been shut down so far, but several others are still operating.

In 1989, the Soviets indicated that they would continue to produce tritium.

Question: What is the status of Iraq's nuclear and special weapons programs?

Answer: Iraq pursued all avenues to produce enriched uranium for its weapons program, but we do not believe Iraq has produced sufficient fissile material for a nuclear device.

If Iraq's nuclear program had not been interrupted by the Gulf War, it could have had enough nuclear material for a device as early as late 1992.

How soon Saddam could have enough material now depends in large part on the UN Special Committee and how much is left of Saddam's nuclear infrastructure when destruction activities cease. But the expertise for nuclear weapons development remains in Iraq.

Saddam had considerable external assistance for his special weapons programs. Much has been done by many countries to close the door to future assistance. Nonetheless, Iraq was inventive in getting around export laws and in exploiting unwary companies.

Many sites essential to the nuclear weapons program were bombed in the war, but hiding much equipment and some facilities Iraq prevented a more complete destruction of the program.